Gunky time and indeterminate existence

The paper criticizes an argument recently presented by Ross Cameron. The argument purports to show that, if time is gunky (that is, if there are no time atoms), and if changes in existence are underwritten by events of coming to be, then there are cases of indeterminate existence. The putative reason is that, if time is gunky, then events of coming to be cannot be instantaneous, and hence, changes in existence must be gradual, non-clear-cut. The paper argues that this argument conflates two different readings of \u201cevent of coming to be\u201d. Under one reading, the argument is unsound. Under the other, the argument is valid only if a further, nontrivial premise is added, which concerns the relation between time atoms, instants, and instantaneous events

Agency and fictional truth: a formal study on fiction-making

Fictional truth, or truth in fiction/pretense, has been the object of extended scrutiny among philosophers and logicians in recent decades. Comparatively little attention, however, has been paid to its inferential relationships with time and with certain deliberate and contingent human activities, namely, the creation of fictional works. The aim of the paper is to contribute to filling the gap. Toward this goal, a formal framework is outlined that is consistent with a variety of conceptions of fictional truth and based upon a specific formal treatment of time and agency, that of so-called stit logics. Moreover, a complete axiomatic theory of fiction-making TFM is defined, where fiction-making is understood as the exercise of agency and choice in time over what is fictionally true. The language L of TFM is an extension of the language of propositional logic, with the addition of temporal and modal operators. A distinctive feature of L with respect to other modal languages is a variety of operators having to do with fictional truth, including a \u2018fictionality\u2019 operator M (to be read as \u201cit is a fictional truth that\u201d). Some applications of TFM are outlined, and some interesting linguistic and inferential phenomena, which are not so easily dealt with in other frameworks, are accounted for

The actual future is open

Open futurism is the indeterministic position according to which the future is 'open,' i.e., there is now no fact of the matter as to what future contingent events will actually obtain. Many open futurists hold a branching conception of time, in which a variety of possible futures exist. This paper introduces two challenges to (branching-time) open futurism, which are similar in spirit to a challenge posed by Kit Fine to (standard) tense realism. The paper argues that, to address the new challenges, open futurists must (i) adopt an objective, non-perspectival notion of actuality and (ii) subscribe to an A-theoretic, dynamic conception of reality. Moreover, given a natural understanding of "actual future," (iii) open futurism is naturally coupled with the view that a unique, objectively actual future exists, contrary to a common assumption in the current debate. The paper also contends that recognising the existence of a unique actual future helps open futurists to avoid potential misconceptions

Out of nothing

Graham Priest proposed an argument for the conclusion that \u2018nothing\u2019 occurs as a singular term and not as a quantifier in a sentence like (1) \u2018The cosmos came into existence out of nothing\u2019. Priest\u2019s point is that, intuitively, (1) entails (C) \u2018The cosmos came into existence at some time\u2019, but this entailment relation is left unexplained if \u2018nothing\u2019 is treated as a quantifier. If Priest is right, the paradoxical notion of an object that is nothing plays a role in our very understanding of reality. In this note, we argue that Priest\u2019s argument is unsound: the intuitive entailment relation between (1) and (C) does not offer convincing evidence that \u2018nothing\u2019 occurs as a term in (1). Moreover, we provide an explanation of why (1) is naturally taken to entail (C), which is both plausible and consistent with the standard, quantificational treatment of \u2018nothing\u2019

The Coat Problem. Counterfactuals, Truth-makers, and Temporal specification

Standard semantic treatments of counterfactuals appeal to a relation of similarity between possible worlds. Similarity, however, is a vague notion. Lewis suggests reducing the vagueness of similarity by adopting a principle known as 'late departure' (LD): the more the past two worlds share, the more they are similar. LD has several virtues. However, as Bennett points out, a standard semantics based on LD suffers from the so-called coat problem. In a nutshell, we are led to assign counterintuitive truth-values to counterfactuals whose antecedent time is left underspecified. In the present paper, we argue that the coat problem may be solved by defining a time-sensitive notion of similarity. To illustrate, we assume a Priorean, tensed language, interpreted on branching-time frames in the usual, 'Ockhamist' way, and we enrich it with a counterfactual connective. Within this framework, we define a time-sensitive relation of similarity, based on Yablo's work on truth-makers and partial truth. In the resulting semantics, which has independent interest, the coat problem does not arise

I padri fondatori: Frege, Russell, Moore

Esposizione sintetica del pensiero di Gottlob Frege, di Bertrand Russell e di George Moore, con particolare attenzione ai temi di filosofia del linguaggio

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Esposizione sintetica del pensiero di Ludwig Wittgenstei

Logos in fabula. Un'indagine filosofica sui personaggi fittizi

Una narrazione (o fabula) è essenzialmente logos, discorso. I discorsi sono sia entità strutturate, dotate di forma logica, sia entità ‘ancorate’ al mondo, dotate di proprietà referenziali. Ma le narrazioni hanno qualcosa in più degli altri discorsi: hanno personaggi. I personaggi letterari sono stati l’oggetto di un vasto dibattito, iniziato nell’antichità. Che cosa sono? qual è il loro statuto ontologico? quali sono le loro connessioni con l’opera e la creatività degli autori? Logos in fabula presenta i principali contributi contemporanei alla discussione, e le loro connessioni con temi centrali della filosofia del linguaggio e della logica. Il libro mira a una dissoluzione di questi problemi: la questione centrale non sarebbe la natura dei personaggi, ma quale sia il ruolo della nozione di personaggio. Secondo Giuseppe Spolaore, questo ruolo sarebbe eminentemente quello, formale, di caratterizzare la struttura di discorso piuttosto che quello, referenziale, di specificare come il discorso sia ‘ancorato’ al mondo